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‘The Only Absolute Guarantee’

A Brief on Canada’s Nuclear Weapons Policies
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By the Canadian Pugwash Group
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The Canadian Pugwash Group1 submits this Brief on Nuclear
Weapons Issues to the Government of Canada for its Dialogue on
Foreign Policy. The Brief responds to two Questions for Discussion:
• “What should be our distinctive role in promoting
global security?”
• “Should Canada do more to address conditions giving rise to
conflict and insecurity beyond our borders? If so, where?”

A. Current Canadian Policy
Foreign Minister Bill Graham recapitulated the priorities of Canada’s
non-proliferation arms control and disarmament policy in his address to the
Conference on Disarmament March 19, 2002.
We seek the total elimination of all weapons of mass
destruction. To that end we will work to achieve the full
implementation of the 13 Practical Steps agreed to at the
2000 NPT Review Conference. In that context, we want
early entry into force of the CTBT and, in the interim, the
most effective organization we can devise to support the
treaty regime. The political value of nuclear weapons
must be devalued, particularly because their purpose is
primarily political. The negative security assurances
provided by nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear
weapon states party to the NPT are a vital element
in international security and must be preserved and
respected. ...
The Minister called for vigilance in protecting the legal regime
that underpins the multilateral system.

1 The

Canadian Pugwash Group is the Canadian branch of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs,
which, along with its then President, Sir Joseph Rotblat, was awarded the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to
diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and in the longer run to diminish such arms.”.
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Our societies are based on the rule of law, and the sustainable,
shared global future we seek must have the same basis,
however difficult it may be to obtain universal acceptance
of the rules and establish effective means of enforcement.
Canada showed its commitment to the NPT 13 Steps (see Appendix
“A”) by voting in favour of the New Agenda Coalition omnibus resolution,
“Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,” at
UNGA 57. Canada was the only NATO country to vote yes.
The resolution upheld inter alia:
• A call for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an
ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;
• Entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
and maintenance of the moratorium on test explosions;
• Resumption of negotiations on a treaty banning the
production of fissile materials;
• Prevention of an arms race in outer space;
• Nuclear Weapons States to maintain security assurances not
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
• Destruction of all nuclear warheads affected by the treaty
process to make nuclear disarmament irreversible.
• Requirement, ultimately, of a universal, multilaterally
negotiated legally binding instrument for a nuclear-weaponfree world.
At the same time, Canada abstained on a second New Agenda
Coalition resolution calling for tactical nuclear weapons to be included as
an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
The resolution was aimed at the removal of the 180 U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons stationed on the soil of six European NATO countries, which call
themselves non-nuclear: Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and
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Turkey. The abstention was caused by Canada’s reluctance to oppose
NATO policy. The NATO Strategic Concept holds that nuclear weapons are
“essential” and must be kept up-to-date as “credible deterrence.” Referring
to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in European countries,
NATO says: “There is a clear rationale for a continued, though much
reduced, presence of sub-strategic forces in Europe.”
Canada’s efforts to get NATO to review its nuclear weapons policies
flowed from the 1998 report of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Trade. The Committee, chaired by Bill Graham,
M.P. (before he assumed his present portfolio), urged Canada to “argue
forcefully” within NATO for a re-examination of the nuclear component in
the Strategic Concept. A review of sorts was started, but it came to naught,
with NATO re-affirming the central tenet of the Strategic Concept: nuclear
weapons are “essential”. While the NATO document makes it clear that the
“Paragraph 32” process is finished, the door was left open to further
discussion on the question. Paragraph 96 of the NATO Report of December
14, 2000, said: “... The Alliance will continue to broaden its engagement
with interested nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions and
the general public.” NATO further acknowledged that it is important for
NATO Allies to maintain and reinvigorate the flow of information with and
about relevant international bodies in this field (Paragraph 115).
The Government of Canada should be commended for having
raised this issue in NATO, but its efforts cannot stop now. The gravest
threat to the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is now posed by the
actions of the United States, our closest ally. Canada, to be true to its
deepest values centering on the rule of law, cannot be silent.
The contradiction between what NATO countries say in the NPT
context and do in the NATO context is astounding. The very same
countries – including Canada – that, in the NPT context, pledge an
“unequivocal undertaking” to the total elimination of nuclear weapons
then, in the NATO context, reaffirm that nuclear weapons “are essential.”
Through its commitment to the NPT and the 13 Steps for total elimination
of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, its allegiance to NATO, Canada
is caught in an incoherent posture. The contradiction of Canada’s nuclear
weapons policies going in two opposite directions at the same time must
be dealt with. Canadian Pugwash subscribes to the analysis of this
dilemma presented by Project Ploughshares:
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Nearly sixty years after the advent of the nuclear age, Canada
still maintains a fundamentally ambiguous policy toward
nuclear weapons. The Canadian government rules out
acquiring its own nuclear weapons, opposes nuclear
proliferation, and asserts that “the only sustainable strategy for
the future is the elimination of nuclear weapons entirely.” But it
also supports the continued possession of nuclear weapons by
its allies, participates in a nuclear-armed alliance, and endorses
NATO’s plan to retain nuclear weapons “for the foreseeable
future.” The Canadian government continues to state that the
defence of Canada must rely on the “nuclear umbrella” that the
United States and other NATO allies have unfurled above this
country, and it continues to provide both physical and political
support for those weapons in a variety of ways. In short, while
the Canadian government condemns any reliance on nuclear
weapons by non-allied countries, it continues to treat those
same weapons as a useful – even necessary – element of
Canada’s defences and those of its allies.2

B. New Policy Directions on Nuclear Weapons.
Contrary to popular belief, the nuclear weapons problem is not
“going away.”
It is staggering to reflect on the total number of nuclear weapons
still in existence. The estimated number is 34,145.

2 “Canada and Nuclear Weapons: Canadian Policies Related to, and Connections to, Nuclear Weapons,” By Bill
Robinson, Project Ploughshares Working Paper 01-5, October, 2002.
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Country
United States
Russia
TOTAL
Percent of Total

Strategic
Tactical
Warheads Warheads

Warheads
in Storage

7,013
5,858

5,000
9,421

1,620
4,000

*Data for the U.S. and Russian arsenals is taken
from the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (see
www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief23.pdf) and, for
the other nuclear weapon states, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (see
www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp). It should
be noted that estimates of the composition and
evolution of the arsenals for China, Israel, India and
Pakistan are extremely difficult to make and these
figures are necessarily estimates.

TOTAL
13,633
19,279
32,912
96 percent

United Kingdom
France
China

200
350
400

India
Pakistan
Israel

35
48
200

TOTAL

34,145*

It is a counterproductive political policy for the five permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council to think that they can have almost an
exclusive right to possess nuclear weapons while other countries are
prohibited from acquiring them. The responsibility for the looming prospect
of a nuclear war of some dimension can be laid squarely on the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China. They have been
warned time and again by both governments and civil society leaders that
their refusal to honour their legal obligation to negotiate the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals is leading to the breakdown of the NonProliferation Treaty.
When the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, the nuclear
powers made three promises:
• A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be achieved
by 1996. Though former U.S. President Bill Clinton was the first to sign the
Treaty, the succeeding Bush Administration turned its back on it, and entryinto-force is now effectively blocked.
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• Negotiations on a convention to ban the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons would come to an “early conclusion.” With
several nuclear weapons states blocking progress, the Conference on
Disarmament cannot even agree on a format for negotiations let alone
carry them out.
• “Systematic and progressive efforts globally” to eliminate
nuclear weapons would be made. It is said that the Moscow Treaty of 2002,
signed by the U.S. and Russia, shows compliance because it will reduce the
number of deployed strategic warheads on each side to a range of 1,700 to
2,200 by 2012. But these weapons will be stored in reserve, not dismantled,
and there are no verification procedures. The key principle of irreversibility,
one of the NPT 13 Steps, is not met.
In short, the pledges made in 1995 have been abandoned. The ruling
of the International Court of Justice that states have an obligation to
conclude negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons, has been
ignored. The “unequivocal undertaking” toward total elimination, given in
2000, has been pushed aside. Jayantha Dhanapala, U.N. Under-SecretaryGeneral for Disarmament Affairs, calls the gulf between declaration and
deeds “alarming.” Instead of genuine progress in nuclear disarmament, the
world has seen the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
the development of improved nuclear weapons, the prospect of more
nuclear tests, and plans for the use of nuclear weapons even against nonnuclear weapon states. Each day, the warning of the Canberra Commission
rings more true: “The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a
constant stimulus to others to acquire them.” North Korea is but one
current example.
During 2001, the Bush Administration conducted a Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), which made clear that its nuclear weapons stockpile
remains a cornerstone of U.S. national security policy. The NPR establishes
expansive plans to revitalize U.S. nuclear forces, and all the elements that
support them, within a New Triad of capabilities that combine nuclear and
conventional offensive strikes with missile defences and nuclear-weapons
infrastructure. The NPR assumes that nuclear weapons will be part of U.S.
military forces for at least the next 50 years; it plans an extensive and
expensive series of programs to modernize the existing force, including a
new ICBM to be operational in 2020 and a new heavy bomber in 2040. The
NPR says that there are four reasons to possess nuclear weapons: to “assure
7

allies and friends”; “dissuade competitors”; “deter aggressors”; and
“defeat enemies.”
It also lists specific scenarios for using nuclear weapons: A conflict
with China over Taiwan, a North Korean attack on South Korea, and an
attack by Iraq on Israel or another neighbour. The new policy means that the
United States will threaten the use of nuclear weapons against countries that
do not themselves possess nuclear weapons; such an action runs counter to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, under the guise of participating in
nuclear disarmament through the dismantling of excess nuclear weapons, the
U.S. is actually widening the role of nuclear weapons far beyond the
deterrence measures against the former Soviet Union in the Cold War. New
U.S. policy directly challenges Canadian policy, which holds that the only
value of nuclear weapons is political, not military. U.S. intentions are stated
clearly in the NPR:
Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defence capabilities
of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide
credible military options to deter a wide range of threats,
including WMD and large-scale conventional military force.
These nuclear capabilities possess unique proportions that give
the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that
are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.
When the NPR is seen in the context of President Bush’s National
Security Strategy, an alarming prospect of the use of nuclear weapons comes
into view. The new Strategy says that the U.S. will take anticipatory action
to defend itself, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy’s attack. The Strategy states: “To forestall or prevent ... hostile acts
by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”
The 2003 war against Iraq flowed from this strategy.
Further, the U.S. has stated that it “reserves the right to respond with
overwhelming force – including through resort to all of our options – to the
use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and
allies” (emphasis added). Has Canada given its assent to be included in such
a policy? If so, were Canadians ever informed of the implications? If not, has
Canada protested being included in a contravention of international law?
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Concerned about a widened rationale for the use of nuclear weapons,
ten U.S. senators, led by Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts,
sent a letter February 21, 2003 to President Bush, expressing “grave
concern” about U.S. policy. They rejected a policy contemplating the option
of using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state:
...Such a shift in U.S. policy would deepen the danger of
nuclear proliferation by effectively telling non-nuclear states
that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter a potential U.S.
attack, and by sending a green light to the world’s nuclear
states that it is permissible to use them. Is this the lesson we
want to send to North Korea, India, Pakistan, or any other
nuclear power?
Faced with a constantly modernizing U.S. nuclear arsenal and new
high tech systems of which missile defences are only one part, existing
nuclear weapons states are likely to retain their nuclear stocks. And more
states, seeing that nuclear weapons are the currency of power, may follow
India, Pakistan and Israel’s recourse to acquiring nuclear weapons. The
danger of a nuclear catastrophe grows.
That catastrophe may well be set off by terrorists. Immediately after
September 11, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan went to Ground Zero in
New York and said that, as horrible as the destruction was, how much worse
it would have been had the terrorists used nuclear devices. He called on
nations to “re-double” efforts to implement fully the relevant treaties to stop
the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In the case of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is not a multiplication of efforts we are
witnessing, but a subtraction.
It is the lack of an enforceable convention to shut off the development
and production of nuclear weapons and fissile materials that has resulted in
the new risk of nuclear terrorism. There has been resolution after resolution
at the U.N. for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; the resolutions actually pass
with handsome majorities (although Canada has never voted in favour).
Public opinion polls throughout the world show that people heavily favour
the abolition of all nuclear weapons. But the major states refuse to enter such
negotiations, so determined are they to preserve their nuclear strength. Now
the world faces not only the traditional prospect of a nuclear war between
states but the use of a nuclear weapon by terrorists who steal
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nuclear materials. In this new age of suicidal terrorism, the threat of attacks
using weapons of mass destruction has grown exponentially. Virtually all
experts on the subject say it is not a question of whether a nuclear attack will
occur, but when.
The new U.S. policies have brought the world to a new moment
regarding nuclear weapons. Instead of progress towards elimination, we
are seeing the dismantling of the non-proliferation regime, constructed so
laboriously over the past three decades. NATO is caught up in this
dismantling. And so is Canada.

C. Next Steps for Canada
At the very least, Canada must stop thinking that piecemeal steps,
such as formulating better reporting requirements, are enough to save
the NPT. A more substantive policy is urgently called for. The erosion
of the NPT is occurring before our eyes, and present trend lines will
lead to its collapse. The end of the NPT would endanger the full gamut
of Canada’s security policies.
A regenerated Canadian policy should center around new efforts
to give life to the following words, contained in the Final Document of
the NPT 2000 Review, which all NPT states parties agreed to:
... the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the
only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons.
World pressure must be mounted on the nuclear weapons states to
implement these words through the adoption of a Nuclear Weapons
Convention, banning the production, deployment, and use of nuclear
weapons. An obvious place to start is to call for a U.N. Security Council
Summit on all Weapons of Mass Destruction, in which the nuclear weapons
powers would have to face up to their responsibilities. Since it does not
appear that the permanent members of the Security Council (i.e., the
declared nuclear weapons states) are disposed to hold such a Summit, then it
is logical to advance the longstanding request of U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan to the international community to hold an international
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conference on nuclear dangers. All states, not just NPT adherents, would
be invited.
In advancing this proposal through a resolution at the U.N., and even
offering to hold the conference in Canada, the Government would strengthen
both the NPT and the role of the United Nations in nuclear disarmament. It
would focus the attention of the world on the overarching fact that the only
way to guarantee safety from a nuclear weapons attack is through
elimination backed up by an intensive verification regime. This would be a
bold move by Canada, wholly consistent with its stated policy of seeking the
total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, such a
concerted campaign to rid the world of nuclear weapons would advance
another important Canadian objective: strengthening the legal regime that
underpins the multilateral system.
This concentrated attention on the objective of nuclear disarmament –
the elimination of nuclear weapons through the adoption of a universal
convention – will re-focus the attention of the public in an intelligible way.
It must be emphasized that the object of this exercise is not just to talk about
the growing nuclear dangers, but to take action. The millions around the
world who marched recently for peace show the growing public aversion to
war. People – and governments – seeking to lessen the risk of catastrophe
through the elimination of nuclear weapons must be listened to.
It is recognized that advancing such a policy may incur the
displeasure, if not the hostility, of the United States. It must be explained
that the object of the policy is not to counter the U.S., but to advance
Canadian interests in breaking out of the incoherent posture we and NATO
are now in, and also to save the legal regime for the elimination of nuclear
weapons. It is entirely proper for a friendly neighbour to point out to the
U.S. that its nuclear weapons policies must implement legal commitments.
Moreover, it is also proper for Canada to remind the U.S. of what it
promised concerning compliance: “We must ensure compliance with
relevant international agreements, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons
Convention.” (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
September 17, 2002, p.2). Canada should point out that the holding of an
international conference would be a method of supporting the U.S. in
building broad international support for universal compliance with existing
regimes.
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Canada must admit, frankly, that the ambiguities and contradictions
of the present moment are no longer tolerable in a world of escalating
nuclear danger. U.S. policies, which dominate the NATO position on
nuclear weapons, must be clarified. France and the U.K. have been saying
for a long time that they will join in nuclear disarmament negotiations
once the numbers of nuclear weapons held by the U.S. and Russia are
substantially (and definitively) reduced. Russia, as a “junior” (and
aspiring to be a “senior”) member of NATO, will not cling to a nuclear
system it can no longer afford. Smaller NATO countries, like Germany,
Belgium and Denmark question NATO’s nuclear policy. Many countries
outside the NATO club, such as China, have consistently voted at the
U.N. for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
Thus, Canadian leadership at this moment would be realistic as well
as courageous. Canada has the credibility to launch such a campaign. It has
tried to move NATO forward; it has voted for the New Agenda Coalition
omnibus resolution. Canada is now instrumentally positioned to be a
“bridge” between NATO and the New Agenda Coalition3. It could
meaningfully transmit New Agenda views to NATO and vice versa. Closing
the gap between the two would be a signal act of leadership on nuclear
disarmament and go a long way to ensuring the survival of the NPT after
the 2005 Review.
Canadian Pugwash is not suggesting that Canada’s policies on
nuclear weapons elimination should rely solely on the holding of an
international conference. Rather, the conference would be a method of
stimulating renewed international energy into fulfilling priority steps for
nuclear disarmament. The following priorities, suggested by the Middle
Powers Initiative,4 are endorsed by Canadian Pugwash. We urge the
Government of Canada to incorporate them and work actively with the
New Agenda Coalition for their fulfillment:
1. Strategic arm s reductions: Implement the May 2002 U.S.-Russian
strategic nuclear arms treaty in accordance with NPT principles so that
reduced warheads and their delivery systems are irreversibly dismantled in a
transparent and verifiable manner; de-alert remaining deployed U.S. and
3 The

New Agenda Coalition includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.

4 “Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Context:” Middle Powers
Initiative Briefing Paper, August 1, 2002.
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Russian nuclear forces in accordance with the NPT commitment to
further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
2. Control of missile defenses and non-proliferation of missiles:
Negotiate regarding plans for missile defenses to avoid obstruction of the
process of nuclear arms control and disarmament and to promote
international stability and the principle of undiminished security for all;
prevent missile proliferation, through ad hoc arrangements, as with North
Korea, and through developing proposals for a missile flight test
moratorium and missile control regimes combining disarmament and nonproliferation objectives.
3. Tactical arms reductions: Unilaterally remove U.S. bombs deployed
under NATO auspices in Europe; create a wider process of control of U.S.
and Russian tactical weapons, including through a) reporting on the 1991
1992 Presidential initiatives; b) formalizing those initiatives, including
verification; c) in accordance with NATO proposals, reciprocally
exchanging information regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic
forces; and d) commencing U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of
non-strategic nuclear weapons.
4. Non-use of nuclear weapons: Reverse trends toward expansion of
options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon
countries, exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; establish the
absolute refusal of middle power countries in multilateral or bilateral
security alliances with the United States to participate in or support first use
of nuclear weapons or to prepare for such use.
5. Ban on nuclear testing: Observe the moratorium on nuclear
testing; achieve entry into force of the CTBT; close the test sites in
Nevada and Novaya Zemlya; renounce development of new or
modified nuclear weapons as contrary to the 2000 commitment to a
diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies and the Article
VI obligation of cessation of the nuclear arms race.
6. Control of fissile materials: Building on heightened awareness of the
threat of terrorist use of nuclear devices and materials, a) create a process of
accounting for and control of fissile materials holdings on a worldwide basis
in accordance with NPT principles of transparency, irreversibility and
verification, with the objective of establishing a global inventory of all

13

weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons; b) commence
negotiations on a fissile materials ban; and c) mandate and increase funding
of the IAEA eight-point plan to improve protection of nuclear materials and
facilities against acts of terrorism.
*

*

*

These are the steps the international community and Canada need to
take in order to move toward a nuclear weapons-free future and a more
secure world. By hosting such an international conference, Canada would
be acting consistently, reflecting its record as the only country during the
Cold War that had the ability and resources to develop nuclear weapons —
but refrained from doing so. The federal government also has considerable
experience organizing international conferences where international norms
were substantively changed because of Canadian efforts. The Ottawa
Landmines Process and the International Criminal Court are only two such
examples.
An international conference needs to be preceded by a sustained effort
to stimulate the public’s interest so that individuals feel they, too, can make a
difference. Representatives from various non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) could hold a preparatory conference, attended by experts, concerned
citizens and youth from across Canada and around the world. It would also
be important to hold prior workshops with leaders in disarmament and
experts in arms control from NATO and New Agenda Coalition countries. A
Canadian-sponsored conference might help to stimulate a sea change in
opinion, prompting politicians, the international media and ministries of
foreign affairs and defence to take notice.
The federal government has taken a lead role before in moving world
opinion. Canadians are proud of Lester B. Pearson’s efforts to establish
peacekeeping forces, Pierre Trudeau’s opening up to China and his peace
initiative, Brian Mulroney’s efforts to end apartheid in South Africa, André
Ouellet’s report to the UN on rapid reaction forces and Lloyd Axworthy’s
Landmines initiative. With the prospect of nuclear war looming, the time is
urgent for Canada to take such an initiative to assure our world a safer
future.
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APPENDIX “A”
(The following excerpt from the Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference
contains the 13 Practical Steps agreed to by all parties to the NPT)
15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and
progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament':
1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without
conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into
force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear
explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate
contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a
programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on
such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate
subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on
Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the
immediate establishment of such a body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and
other related arms control and reduction measures.
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States
Parties are committed under Article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion
of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty
as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic
offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

15
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United
States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that
promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for
all:
•
•

•
•
•
•

Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals
unilaterally.
Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to their nuclear
weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI
and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on
nuclear disarmament.
The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral
initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament
process.
Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear
weapons systems.
A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk
that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total
elimination.
The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the
process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, fissile
material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under
IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of
such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently
outside of military programmes.
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament
process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by
all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995
Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament',
and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required
to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the
achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Advancing Human Security
Raporteur’s Report
by Dr. Erika Simpson
of a meeting held by Pugwash Canada
at Thinker’s Lodge, Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada
July 17-19, 2002
The Annual General Meeting (AGM) of Pugwash Canada at Thinker’s Lodge in Nova
Scotia focused on the general themes of technology and human security, in part to
prepare for the international Pugwash meeting on “Advancing Human Security,” to be
hosted by Canada in Halifax in 2003. This year’s AGM was attended by 25 Pugwashites
from across Canada (hereafter referred to as the Group). It featured keynote speaker Ms.
Jill Sinclair from Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT), as well as four workshops reflecting human security themes. The morning
session was chaired by Ambassador (ret.) Geoffrey Pearson, President of the United
Nations Association in Canada and Senator Douglas Roche, chairman of Pugwash
Canada, presided over the afternoon workshops and ensuing discussion.
The keynote speaker was introduced by the chair, Mr. Geoffrey Pearson, as the Director
General, International Security (IDD), at DFAIT. Most recently, Ms. Sinclair was the
Coordinator of the International Commission on Interventional and State Sovereignty.
She has also served abroad in numerous positions, including at Canada’s mission to the
United Nations (UN). In her fifty-minute presentation, Ms. Sinclair highlighted general
and specific objectives and concerns of the Department of Foreign Affairs; addressed
conceptual issues surrounding the concept of human security; and suggested roles and
initiatives that could be undertaken by individuals, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) such as Pugwash Canada, and the international community. She also emphasized
the importance of using emerging technologies appropriately in order to deal with human
security concerns. Accordingly, she drew the Group’s attention to the imperative of
understanding and opposing current and future plans to weaponize outer space.
In her wide-ranging overview of many of the traditional and ‘less-traditional’ human
security challenges facing countries now, Ms.Sinclair mentioned problems ranging from
HIV/AIDS to illegal drugs to non-existent social safety nets. Notably, countries and
regions were defining human security in terms that resonated with them; as a ‘peoplecentred’ approach to increasing individual security, it was important to appreciate that
others, particularly in the Third World, might not conceive of human security challenges
in typically Canadian ways. While Ms. Sinclair emphasized the need in Canada and
abroad to conceive of new technological ‘fixes’ to deal with all types of human security
problems, she also underlined the necessity to engage with industries, corporations, and
businesses to develop solutions that appealed to their ‘enlightened self-interest’ and
market interests (e.g. a new technology to enable diamond fingerprinting conceived of
in Canada might be introduced at the UN in two years, thus saving lives in conflictridden areas like Sierra Leone and satisfying the monetary concerns of diamond
industries such as DeBeers and Antwerp).
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While Ms. Sinclair acknowledged that the links between technology, science, and
advancing human security were endless, she thought it worthwhile to focus the Group’s
attention on three issues where the links between technology and human security were
particularly acute: namely the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the
weaponization of outer space; and issues surrounding international treaty compliance
and verification.
As Ms. Sinclair pointed out, the CTBT was a global effort that effectively engaged
science and technology to develop the most sophisticated verification system heretofore
possible. While political stonewalling delayed the CTBT negotiations for years, until
1997, scientific work and experimentation continued apace. The final result—a still-born
treaty—was due ultimately to a failure of political will, particularly in the United States.
Nevertheless, an important lesson was that intense scientific efforts could possibly lay the
groundwork for future successful treaty negotiations. An important task for a group like
Pugwash, with its strong scientific background, would be to help advance similar
solutions to human security challenges.
Turning to recently-emerging American plans to weaponize outer space, particularly
plans espoused by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to achieve ‘full-spectrum
dominance’, Ms. Sinclair asked whether Pugwash might use its scientific expertise and
understanding to study the surrounding issues, marshal various arguments, and press
government representatives, as well as users of satellite technology (e.g. agriculturalists,
businesses, farmers) to avoid the militarization of space. Whereas various technological
and military security interests in the United States could be expected to pursue longerterm funding for space-based programs, there were other sectoral interests in the United
States not yet aware of the underlying issues and inherent security threats in any race to
weaponize outer space (e.g. interdependent, telecommunication satellite systems could be
threatened). Ms. Sinclair wondered whether Canadian voices opposed to American plans
to weaponize space--yet sympathetic to legitimate American fears surrounding rogue
states’ possible plans for attack--might be strengthened by seeking allies within the U.S.,
especially among American senators, as well as within Europe and Japan. In other words,
might a policy of ‘relentless engagement’ with Americans, including the current
democratically-elected US administration, lead, eventually, to an international decision to
ban the militarization of space?
It would also be important in the near- and long-term future to use technology to ensure
effective international treaty compliance. Many Americans had warranted (and
unwarranted) concerns relating to treaty compliance—concerns, for example, that were
sufficient to jettison the CTBT and the Biological Toxins and Weapons Convention.
Traditional Canadian appeals to remember our humanity and trust might not resonate
with Americans and others (e.g. Indians, Pakistanis) but reasonable, non-ideological
explanations of the trustworthiness of emerging treaty compliance verification systems
could.
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In her concluding comments, the speaker pointed out that Canada’s multilateralist
approach continues to make ‘security sense’ for members of the international community
and the community as a whole; the benefits of working together in associations of three or
more to increase security can break the ‘simplemindedness’ of traditional strategic
thought. Similarly, taking a ‘hard-headed’ human security approach helps undermine the
strategic myths to which many realists adhere, so that individuals, states, and the
international community can develop the capacity to move to the next level. While such
‘capacity-building’ is important, as is education for peace, from Pugwash’s perspective,
probably science and technological developments are the most promising. These “have
given human beings powers that far outstrip their collective good judgement,” but, as
Senator Roche said so often during the Cold War, “we can never allow ourselves the
luxury of despair”—we can control science and technology, and, in Sinclair’s view,
“Pugwash is the best place to start.”
During the Group’s extensive discussion following Ms. Sinclair’s presentation, a wide
variety of questions and comments were raised. For the sake of clarity, these have been
grouped here into five major themes:
Major Themes
1. The militarization of outer space and the development of National
Missile Defense
One of the principal themes brought forward during the discussion concerned the
underlying objectives of US plans to build a National Missile Defence (NMD) and more
extensive Theatre Missile Defenses (TMD), as well as their implications, particularly
for the peaceful uses of outer space and for Canadian defence and security. It was
argued that Canada was ‘fence-sitting’ on the NMD issue, while others pointed out that
those opposed to fence-sitting tend to be NMD proponents. The government
representative from DFAIT suggested that taking more time to reflect and think about
the issue was wise rather than misguided, especially as the United States was
developing more concrete ideas about the methods, timeframes, and deployment of such
a system, and undertaking a global tour to assess different views of its NMD plans.
Some pointed out, too, that since public opinion in Canada was divided, politicians
would be reluctant to take a stand in the near future.
2. The merits and demerits of ‘incessant’ or ‘constructive engagement’
Many emphasized the advantages of pursuing a Canadian strategy of ‘incessant’ or
‘constructive engagement, especially when dealing with the current American
administration’s defense plans. Participants noted as well the demerits of devoting
considerable energy to a policy of constructive engagement and quiet diplomacy, rather
than ‘megaphone diplomacy’. In the final analysis, there was always a danger that
government departments, such as DFAIT and DND, would capitulate to American plans
given issue linkages (e.g. free trade, soft wood lumber negotiations, and Canada’s
membership in the UN and NATO). On the other hand, outright withdrawal from NATO
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and declaratory (self-righteous) criticism of the US would also serve little purpose,
especially given the short-sightedness of such strategies. The key would be to recognized
“when to push publicly and when to engage.” Learning to use concepts, vocabulary, and
pre-emptive tactics synonymous with a strategy of ‘incessant engagement’ could pay
dividends.
3. Avoiding a more divided, dangerous world
There was considerable debate about the role and responsibilities of Canada’s
peacekeeping forces. Some members of the Group argued strongly that human security
priority areas for Canada should remain focused on UN peacekeeping, especially the
concept of a UN rapid reaction capability, while others maintained that Canada’s
contribution to NATO’s peacekeeping troops in IFOR and Afghanistan constituted a
legitimate or illegitimate commitment to peacekeeping. Several general principles were
enumerated by participants regarding Canada’s peacekeeping role, namely: Canada
should improve its current status as 33rd on the list of troop contributors to the UN; the
Department of Defence should act swiftly to close the commitment-capability gap by
mandating more personnel to peacekeeping duties and acquiring long-range capabilities
suitable to peacekeeping (e.g. helicopters); and the Canadian government should be
careful to continue in its tradition of providing troops for peacekeeping missions
mandated by the UN.
4. The scientific community’s research agenda
Members agreed that while scientific technology could advance human security,
scientific knowledge could also destroy mankind’s future. Just as individual scientists
had been mandated to create the original nuclear weapon, individuals might be
persuaded by rogue states, or non-state actors such as terrorists, to help transform
nuclear, biological, or chemical materials into bombs. As a society, should we allow
scientists to follow their own research interests and individual pursuits? Or should we
present them with the problems to solve that we want them to address? The list of human
security problems that society and scientists should be concerned about will grow given
global warming, biotechnology’s implications, stem cell technology, and issues
concerning genetically-mutated foods.

5. Maintaining and enhancing international regimes and treaties
In its discussion, Group members spent considerable time discussing recent American
plans to withhold support from different international regimes, such as the CTBT and the
Ottawa Land Mines Process, and to ‘unsign’ various international treaties such as the
ABM Treaty and the International Criminal Court. To be sure, there are minor technical
and political difficulties with all these types of formal and informal regimes. In the end,
however, the most effective strategies for achieving a more secure, peaceful world will be
those that enhance, rather than undermine, modes of international cooperation. Indeed,
there was general unease about the unilateralism of the US and the heedless manner in
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which it seems to be damaging or discarding agreements and regimes of great import and
meaning to others.
Workshops
The afternoon session featured four workshops relating to technology and human
security which were conducted by various experts: disarmament (Senator Douglas
Roche); conflict (Dr. Walter Dorn); the environment (Dr. Adele Buckley); and
development (Ms. Reford).
Disarmament (presented by Senator Douglas Roche)
Senator Roche argued that technology is a ‘two-way sword’ which makes possible a
treaty like the CTBT, yet also renders new types of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) possible. Scientific knowledge and technology, on their own, cannot solve all
types of political problems. Therefore, whereas Pugwash consists of many ‘pure’ or
‘hard’ scientists, the contribution of other types of scientists—and more importantly,
human will, determination, and the human desire to abolish nuclear weapons in the 21st
century, are paramount. The central goal for Pugwash must remain the elimination of the
scourge of nuclear weapons, including their elimination from the stockpiles, minds, and
hearts of the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), especially the P5 (e.g. the US, Russia,
China, France, U.K.)
In keeping with Canada’s position as the United States’ closest neighbour, it is important
to discourage the US from pursuing its current ‘hyperpower’ policy. For example, the
Moscow treaty, which purportedly reduced (but actually merely redeployed thousands of
strategic nuclear weapons), needs to be criticized for its ‘sleight-of-hand’ disarmament.
The US government’s reluctance to live up to its Article VI commitment to the Non
Proliferation Treaty is also alarming; as the UN Under-Secretary General for
Disarmament points out, the NPT is being ignored, bypassed, and thus eroded.
Senator Roche also expressed dismay that the NWS have refused to start down the path
recommended by the New Agenda Coalition (which seeks the total elimination of nuclear
weapons through a 13 Step program); that the US and Russia have withdrawn from the
ABM Treaty; that the NWS refuse to support the CTBT; and that evidence is mounting
the US may resume nuclear testing and seek ‘full-spectrum dominance’. What is to be
done? Senator Roche’s long history of involvement in disarmament (at the UN as
Canada’s Ambassador for Disarmament and as Chair of the Middle Power Initiative)
taught him that the moral and legal arguments against nuclear weapons are most
persuasive. The abomination of nuclear weapons and the horrors of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki are the moral foundation upon which our whole argument must rest—but the
legal arguments (e.g. as put forward by Charles Moxley Nuclear Weapons in the PostCold War World) and as contained in the Nuclear Weapons Convention provide a
necessary legal basis for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
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Finally, the Senator acknowledged that Canada is caught in a massive contradiction
between its loyalty to the UN and its commitment to NATO. The UN seeks to eliminate
nuclear weapons while NATO’s Strategic Concept claims they are ‘essential’. Alone,
Canada cannot make a significant contribution but in partnership with other like-minded
states, especially through the New Agenda Coalition and the Middle Power Initiative,
perhaps in a process reminiscent of the Ottawa Land Mines Process, Canada could make
significant progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world.
Conflict (presented by Dr. Walter Dorn)
Dr. Dorn reminded the audience of the 1955 Russell-Einstein manifesto which counselled
us to “remember your humanity and forget the rest.... If you cannot, there lies before you
the risk of universal death.” While one of the ongoing tasks of Pugwash has been to bear
in mind the perils of technology, at the same time technology holds considerable promise
to help solve humanity’s human security challenges. While many will be discouraged in
the present tense climate, due in part to September 11 and the threat of nuclear war
between India and Pakistan, we should remember that we have a great deal to be thankful
for in comparison to the tense and dangerous 1980s. The Cold War standoff has ended,
the UN Security Council is no longer paralysed, proxy wars are no longer being
conducted in Africa and Asia, etc.. Clearly Pugwash played an important role, along with
significant leaders like Mikhail Gorbachev, to end the Cold War and engineer a ‘common
security’ approach.
Dr. Dorn explained that Canada was the first country that had the capability and
knowledge to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, yet decided to rid itself of them.
Canada’s history of delegitimizing nuclear weapons could be relevant to persuading other
countries to follow our example. At the same time, we need to keep in mind that other
agents of mass destruction (e.g. anthrax, biological weapons, chemical weapons), as well
as new types of conventional weapons (e.g. small arms) are being developed and have
already killed thousands of people. Pugwash needs to remember that nuclear weapons are
the ultimate evil, however other types of weapons also need to be abolished.
Turning to his recommendations for ameliorating conflict, the speaker suggested that
technology could usefully serve to end disputes peacefully (e.g. it could be used to help
gather intelligence, monitor ongoing disputes, detect illicit smuggling, etc.). New
technologies are constantly being developed to improve aerial reconnaissance, enhance
satellite communication, and protect peacekeepers. Other useful initiatives would include
an ‘Open Skies’ agreement (similar to President Eisenhower’s original proposal); a UN
Rapid Reaction capability; and a strengthened Stand-by High Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG).

The Environment (presented by Dr. Adele Buckley)
Dr. Buckley’s presentation focused primarily on four environmental factors affecting
human security: population pressure; development; global change; and conflict &
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terrorism. Population pressure entails all the trends in human population growth affecting
consumption and the earth’s biological productivity (e.g. experts generally agree the
world’s population will level off at about 10 billion by 2050 but we are already living
beyond the planet’s capacity for biological productivity). Consequently, political stability
will be affected by resource competition and ‘environmental refugee-ism’. Access to
water could be the fundamental issue of the 21st century given current needs, trends and
deficiencies. But the developed countries are not renewing their aging water
infrastructure nor are the developing countries able to devote more funds to treating and
obtaining more water. New methods of conservation, forest and watershed management,
pollution prevention, and global waste management will be needed.
Turning to other environmental factors that affect human security, Dr. Buckley focused
on growing energy security needs and global warming. Examples illustrating the
problem are that the earth’s warming will continue--it is predicted that it will rise by 2-8
degrees Celsius--yet in 2050, 40 percent of the world’s consumption will still be reliant
upon fossil fuel. One option is nuclear power but nuclear waste promises to be a major
human security issue given that the US is the only country with a proposal to establish a
nuclear waste dump site. Nuclear plants, under terrorist attack, could release
radioactivity putting high density population areas in danger. With nuclear energy comes
the associated production of weapons; moreover, the prevention of acquisition by
terrorists of nuclear materials is an intractable problem. Nevertheless, coal (the
alternative in India and China) results in local smog and global pollution problems. New
methods of energy conservation, alternative technologies, and creative political and
organizational initiatives will be needed.
Clearly, the challenges facing humanity in this century are unprecedented. Is there
technology to support change and adaptation? Dr. Buckley asserted that new technology
for management will be needed, including a ‘science of integration’ and a vastlyimproved structure of global environment and development institutions. Given that
human changes to the earth’s system do not operate in simple cause-effect relationships,
we can expect that a single type of change triggers a large number of responses, which
then reverberate or cascade through the system. Evidently, the types of large-scale global
changes that have been outlined will have an interactive and cascading effect on human
security. Therefore, it is most important that we call the Russell-Einstein manifesto’s
admonition to ‘remember your humanity and forget the rest.’
Development (presented by Ms. Stephanie McCandless Reford)
Ms. McCandless-Reford worked with young people for forty years in order to bring
world affairs to high schools and teachers. This experience led her to reflect upon the
meaning of ‘development’. Development can mean raising money for good causes,
inciting growth and expansion, increasing GDP, or working to increase a country’s
standing on the UN’s human development index. She has concluded that development
relates to all these topics but most importantly, Canadians need to recall they are
‘internationalists’. It is our responsibility to restore a sense of hope, especially since the
powerless feel such a painful sense of great opportunities lost. Unfortunately, the great
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hope and promise of democracy has declined, the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights has
faded, and while 40 percent of the world lives in relative democracy, the situation has
never been worse.
The speaker spoke passionately in favour of the idea that the leadership potential of
children is the greatest resource that we have. We need ‘hope of leadership’ for the next
generation and in order to do that, we need to build a leadership building initiative on a
global scale. “Be the change you want to see in the world” said Ghandi, leading Ms.
McCandless Reford to outline for the Group her proposal to initiate a ‘Global Youth
Leadership Training Initiative’. Her proposal, in the form of a letter written to the UN
Secretary-General, is intended to inspire youth to recognize that their ideas and
energies are valued by the leaders of today.
A first step to establish this initiative would be a conference to bring together committed
leaders of today who share the view that youth are a resource, not a problem. From this
conference, a series of youth leadership goals could emerge, as well as recommendations
for infrastructure and support for coordination in participating countries, and from within
the UN itself. The speaker outlined many of her ideas to help establish such an initiative
in a detailed proposal attached to her letter to the UN Secretary-General. She concluded
with the suggestion that a meeting take place between UN representatives and selected
youth training program leaders to discuss the merits of the concept, the direction it should
take, and the requirements to make it effective.

General Discussion
During the Group’s general discussion following the workshops, a broad range of
questions and comments were put forward. For the sake of clarity, these have been
grouped here into four major themes, generally reflecting the subjects of the workshops:
1. Disarmament
Discouragement was repeatedly expressed about the near-disappearance of the antinuclear movement and the absence of an informed and concerned public. Many of the
dark clouds on the horizon relating to nuclear weapons were directly, or indirectly, traced
to the policies and behaviour of the US, and more immediately to the attitudes and
approaches of the Bush administration. Consequently, the Group spent considerable time
discussing the merits of returning to ‘moral considerations’ and a strategy of
‘constructive engagement’ when dealing with American and Canadian elected officials,
as well as the media.
2. Conflict
It was suggested that new ways of thinking, including ‘horizontal management’ and
‘holistic thinking’ could help establish the new structures that are needed to eliminate war
as a social institution and produce creative policy-making within government, academe,
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and NGOs. How do we engage the US in a broader discussion beyond merely the
prevention of terrorism? Perhaps more attention needs to be paid to understanding the
root causes of war and terrorism in human behaviour. It was strongly asserted that
nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated in a vacuum. It will require an ‘architecture’ on
many matters relating to the causes of war, including the development of more
international institutions and the strengthening of international law. The problems that
must concern Pugwash members are inter-related and wide-ranging; a narrow focus on
eliminating nuclear weapons should be Pugwash’s primary, but not its sole objective.
3. The Environment
There was very wide agreement within the Group that mitigating the effect of negative
environmental factors would be very important to ensuring human security. But there was
disagreement about the sustainability of nuclear energy as a technological solution to the
problem of energy security. In particular, concerns were raised about the possibility of
developing a nuclear waste site in the Canadian shield with its attendant implications (e.g.
$13 billion price tag, terrorist threats, long-term storage problems, leakage, etc.).
General Recommendations
In discussing future roles for the Canadian government and Pugwash Canada, many
specific recommendations were put forward by individuals though these were not placed
before the Group for endorsement as a whole. These can be broadly grouped into five
recommendations to:
•

•

•

encourage Pugwash Canada to discuss its broad-ranging concerns with
representatives of government, the private sector, and universities; for instance, it
would be important to establish closer links with European scientists, the Union
of Concerned Scientists, and deans and departmental chairs of Canadian
universities. DFAIT’s new ‘Fast-talk’ initiative was also mentioned and some
Pugwashites expressed strong interest in participating;
mandate Pugwash Canada to develop a written statement outlining its general
concerns and recommendations with respect to US unilateralism; in
particular, members unanimously endorsed the statement “Sleight-of-Hand
Nuclear Disarmament: How Pugwash Should Respond,” prepared by Senator
Douglas Roche, on behalf of Pugwash Canada, for the upcoming
International Council meeting in La Jolla, California;
explore initiatives to avoid the weaponization of outer space, including
establishing an ‘International Scientific Board’ that would oversee research
projects, subject them to transparent review, and have strict powers to halt certain
technologies; obtaining more signatures for a ‘space preservation treaty’;
opposing the Pentagon’s plans to control weather patterns; and distributing Helen
Caldicott’s new book, The New Nuclear Danger. Moreover, there was very wide
agreement in the Group that Pugwash Canada hold at least one Working Group
next year on the subject of the weaponization of outer space.
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•

•

broaden Pugwash’s focus from the abolition of all types of weapons, especially
WMD, to deal with all types of problems in order to establish a ‘new paradigm for
policy-making’. Such an endeavour might entail Pugwash’s endorsement of all
types of proposals, ranging from the ‘Tobin Tax’ to the ‘Global Youth Training
Initiative’. But, most importantly, it would require attention to a whole range of
human security challenges and ‘interactive’ views, including a greater focus on
moral obligations;
finally, there was general sentiment in the Group in favour of involving more
young Canadians in Pugwash’s activities, whether by encouraging more
Pugwash-sponsored activities at the university level, recruiting more young
scientists, or by inviting less senior and established people into Pugwash Canada.
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